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Abstract
We study the framework of abductive logic programming extended with integrity constraints. For this
framework, we introduce a new measure of the simplicity of an explanation based on its degree of arbitrari-
ness: the more arbitrary the explanation, the less appealing it is, with explanations having no arbitrariness
— they are called constrained — being the preferred ones. In the paper, we study basic properties of con-
strained explanations. For the case when programs in abductive theories are stratified we establish results
providing a detailed picture of the complexity of the problem to decide whether constrained explanations
exist.
To appear in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming (TPLP).
1 Introduction
Abduction is an important form of nonmonotonic reasoning. The concept was introduced in
the late 19th century by the American philosopher Charles Sander Peirce (1995) as an infer-
ence scheme aimed at deriving potential explanations of observations.1 A general characteristic
of abductive reasoning is the existence of multiple abductive explanations, which are typically
not equally compelling. Therefore, identifying a subclass, possibly narrow, of “preferred ex-
planations” is an important problem. Following the Occam’s principle, a typical approach is to
identify as “preferred” those explanations that are, in some sense, simple. Several concepts of
simplicity were considered in the literature, most notably those based on minimality with respect
to inclusion and cardinality. In the context of logic programming, abduction was first studied by
Eshghi and Kowalski (1989), and then by Kakas and Mancarella (1990b) under the brave reason-
ing variant of the stable-model semantics. That work established abductive logic programming
as an important subarea of abduction, where the background theory is represented by a logic
program, often with negation in the bodies and disjunction in the heads, under any of the stan-
dard logic programming semantics (Kakas et al. 1992; Denecker and Kakas 2002). This paper is
concerned with the problem of limiting the space of explanations in the framework of abductive
1 Peirce gave abduction the following informal interpretation: “The surprising fact, C, is observed; but if A were true, C
would be a matter of course: hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.”
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logic programming extended by integrity constraints. We introduce a new measure of the quality
of an explanation in terms of its arbitrariness and propose to consider as “preferred” only those
explanations that minimize arbitrariness. Our approach can be applied with any of the standard
semantics of logic programs.
Example 1
Let us consider the following scenario. It is Saturday and Bob is known to ski on Saturdays if it
is not snowing. And when he is not skiing, he is on campus. We can represent this information
by the logic program:
{ saturday. skiing← saturday, not snows. on campus← not skiing. }
If it’s Saturday and we see Bob on campus, we can abduce it is snowing. Otherwise, Bob
would be skiing. To put it differently, given our background knowledge, the fact snows is an ab-
ductive explanation (explanations will be formally defined in the next section) to our observation
on campus. 
In this example, there is only one explanation of the observation (assuming all that is relevant
to our reasoning has been mentioned). However, a general feature of abductive reasoning is the
existence of multiple explanations. Typically, they are not all equally likely. Thus, narrowing
down the range of possible explanations to a smaller set of “most likely” or “preferred” ones
becomes an important problem. The key to it is a well-motivated notion of “preferred”. We will
now present an example meant to develop intuitions behind the notion of “preferredness”.
Example 2
Let us consider the following scenario modeling security breaches in an information system. A
security breach at a component of the system may only occur when a person with an account
makes an unauthorized access. Regular staff personnel have accounts on the system if they com-
plete training and have their security clearance current. Visitors may also be granted an account
but only with an approval by the head of the IT department. This situation can be described by
the following program:
account(X)← staff (X), trained(X),current(X).
account(X)← visitor(X),approved(X).
security breach(W )← unauthorized access(W,X),account(X).
Let us also assume that tom and mary are regular staff members and dan is a visitor (there may
also be other individuals in these groups and additional ones not mentioned as staff or visitors
in the program), and that the system has information that tom completed training. That is, the
program also contains facts
staff (tom). staff (mary). visitor(dan). trained(tom).
If we observe security breach(warehouse) (the security of warehouse was compromised), there
are several possible explanations. Below we list some of them:
Etom = {unauthorized access(warehouse, tom),current(tom)}
Emary = {unauthorized access(warehouse,mary), trained(mary),current(mary)}
Su = {unauthorized access(warehouse,U),staff (U), trained(U),current(U)},
where U is a name in the domain, possibly not mentioned in the program,
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Edan = {unauthorized access(warehouse,dan),approved(dan)}
Vu = {unauthorized access(warehouse,U),visitor(U),approved(U)},
where U is a name in the domain, possibly not mentioned in the program
Etom,dan = {unauthorized access(warehouse, tom),current(tom),
unauthorized access(warehouse,dan),approved(dan)}.
The key question is whether there are principled ways to eliminate some of these explanations as
less likely than others. 
Most approaches to the problem of selecting preferred explanations follow the Occam’s prin-
ciple of parsimony that entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily and that among possible
explanations the simplest one tends to be the right one. The first part of that principle is non-
controversial. However, simplicity is a notoriously complex concept and different formalizations
of it are possible! They range from the standard one based on the subset minimality, to its ver-
sions and refinements that require minimum cardinality, minimum weight, or minimality under
prioritization of individual hypotheses (Eiter et al. 1997). In our example, the explanations Etom,
Emary, SU , U 6= tom, Edan, and VU , U 6= dan, are subset minimal and so, preferred under the
subset minimality criterion. The explanations Stom, Vdan, and Etom,dan are not. If we use a more
restrictive criterion of minimum cardinality, the preferred explanations are Etom and Edan. Let
us assume that there are reasons to view each of them as wrong (tom and dan can conclusively
demonstrate they were not involved). Under the subset minimality criterion, we now prefer ex-
planations Emary, SU , U 6= tom, and VU , U 6= dan, while under the minimum cardinality criterion
Emary and VU , U 6= dan, are preferred.
Let us look more carefully at these last two types of explanations. They are specific in that
they speak about concrete individuals. However, the explanations of the latter type select an
arbitrary individual in the domain (explicitly mentioned or not, as long as it is not dan), with
no particular reason to choose one over another. In other words, investigators of the security
breach would have no reason to start their investigation with any particular person and the person
they would consider first would be arbitrarily selected. On the other hand, the explanation Edan
connects the structural information present in the program and the knowledge provided by the
observation in a non-arbitrary (constrained) way — it “invents” no new entities and makes no
arbitrary assumptions. Arguably, it would be the explanation pursued first by the investigators.
One might argue that the family of explanations VU simply points to the existence of a person
who managed to pass as a visitor with an approval for an account and made an unauthorized
access to the IT system, and that this family of explanations can be represented as a single
explanation involving existentially quantified formulas (along the lines of an early work by Pople
(1973)). However, such “existential” explanations while no longer making arbitrary choices lack
specificity.
In this paper we develop these intuitions into a formal measure of the quality of explanations
based on how arbitrary they are. To this end, we introduce the notion of the degree of arbi-
trariness of an explanation: the smaller that value, the less arbitrary the explanation. We define
constrained explanations as those with 0 degrees of arbitrariness, and propose them as preferred.
Our most significant technical results establish the computational complexity of the problems to
decide whether a given explanation is constrained, and whether a constrained explanation ex-
ists. We study the two problems for the case when programs modeling background knowledge
in abductive theories are stratified. This is a common case in abductive logic programming.
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From the technical standpoint it has two interesting aspects. First, the two main semantics of
logic programs, the stable-model semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) and the well-founded
semantics (Van Gelder et al. 1991), as well as several others (but not the supported-model se-
mantics (Marek and Subrahmanian 1992)) collapse in this case. Second, when the background
knowledge is modeled by a stratified program under the stable-model semantics, all general
semantics-independent schemas to define aductive explanations yield the same result. We show
that for abductive theories with stratified logic programs, the two computational problems men-
tioned above are coNP-complete and ΣP2 -complete, respectively. By considering special classes
of stratified programs, we establish the main sources of the complexity of the problem.
The remainder of the paper is organized into five sections. First, we recall basic concepts of
abductive logic programming and discuss four general schemata to define explanations. Next,
we introduce the key concepts for the paper: the degree of arbitrariness in an explanation, and
then arbitrary and constrained explanations. The following section presents our main complexity
results. Next, we discuss related work where, in particular, we note that our results are also
relevant in the area of view update repairs. We conclude by summarizing our contributions and
pointing out problems for future work.
2 Abductive Logic Programs
We consider a fixed vocabulary σ consisting of relation and constant symbols (no function sym-
bols). We write D for the set of constants in σ and assume that D is an infinite countable set
(in some examples, for the sake of simplicity of presentation, we take D to be finite). We write
H for the set of predicate symbols in σ . For Q ⊆H , we define QD to be the set of all ground
atoms whose predicate symbols are in Q. In particular, H D is the Herbrand base of σ .
By S we denote a semantics of logic programs. For now we do not commit to any particular
semantics. As usual, we assume only that S is given in terms of Herbrand interpretations of σ ,
that is, subsets of H D . For a logic program P (in the vocabulary σ ), we denote by semS(P) the
set of Herbrand interpretations of σ that are models of P according to the semantics S. Since
σ is fixed, we omit it from the notation. The most common choice for S is the stable-model
semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988).
We now recall the concept of an abductive theory in the logic programming setting.
Definition 1 (ABDUCTIVE THEORY)
An abductive theory T over a vocabulary σ is a triple 〈P,A ,C 〉, where
– P is a finite logic program over σ
– A ⊆ σ is a finite set of predicate names called the abducible predicates
– C is a finite set of first-order sentences over σ called integrity constraints,
and where every rule in P with an abducible predicate in the head is a ground fact. 
Informally, the program P and the integrity constraints C provide a model (description) of
the problem domain. The program P defines non-abducible predicates (those not in A ) in terms
of abducible predicates (those in A ). The integrity constraints in C impose domain constraints
on abducible and non-abducible predicates in the language. According to the definition, infor-
mation about abducible predicates is given in terms of ground facts. They explicitly specify the
extensions of abducible predicates. We refer to ground atoms based on abducible predicates as
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abducibles. An observation is a set of ground facts based on non-abducible predicates. An ob-
servation may “agree” with the program P and the integrity constraints C . But if it does not,
we assume that this “disagreement” is caused by the incorrect information about the properties
modeled by the abducible predicates. Abductive reasoning consists of inferring updates to the
set of abducibles in the program (removal of some and inclusion of some new ones) so that the
updated program, the integrity constraints and the observation “agree.” Each update that yields
an agreement constitutes a possible explanation of the observation. Several notions of agreement
have been proposed. They are defined in terms of entailment and satisfiability. A program P is
consistent in the semantics S if semS(P) 6= /0. A consistent logic program P skeptically entails a
sentence ϕ (in the same language as P), written P |=S ϕ , if for every M ∈ semS(P), M |= ϕ . A
consistent logic program P skeptically entails a set Φ of sentences, written P |=S Φ, if P |=S ϕ ,
for every ϕ ∈Φ.
We now present four concepts of “agreement”, three of which have received significant atten-
tion in the literature.
Definition 2 (AGREEMENT A (DENECKER AND KAKAS 2002))
Let P be a program and C a set of integrity constraints. An observation O agrees with P and
C if (1) semS(P) 6= /0 (P is consistent); (2) P |=S C ; and (3) P |=S O. 
To get this notion of agreement, it is necessary that the program be consistent and skeptically
entail the observation. But, in addition, the program must also satisfy the integrity constraints in
a very strong sense. Namely, all its models must satisfy them.
Definition 3 (AGREEMENT B (DENECKER AND KAKAS 2002))
Let P be a program and C a set of integrity constraints. An observation O agrees with P and
C if (1) P |=S O; and (2) there is M ∈ semS(P) such that M |= C . 
This definition is a relaxation of the previous one. To get this notion of agreement, at least one
model of the program must satisfy the integrity constraints (not all, as before, and here is where
the conditions are relaxed). This, in particular, means that the program is consistent. Moreover,
exactly as before, the program must skeptically entail the observation.
Definition 4 (AGREEMENT C)
Let P be a program and C a set of integrity constraints. An observation O agrees with P and
C if for every M ∈ semS(P) such that M |= C , M |= O. 
Here to have an agreement, as in Definition 3, we require that at least one model of the program
satisfies the integrity constraints and we weaken the other condition. Namely, we now only re-
quire that the observation holds in every model of the program satisfying the integrity constraints
and not in every model of the programs.
Definition 5 (AGREEMENT D (BARAL AND GELFOND 1994))
Let P be a program and C a set of integrity constraints. An observation O agrees with P and
C if there is M ∈ semS(P) such that M |= C and M |= O. 
This is the final relaxations of the conditions for an agreement. There must be models of
a program that satisfy the integrity constraints (just as in Definition 4). But it is enough that
one of such models (not all, as in Definition 4) satisfies the observation. Each of these types of
agreement yields the corresponding notion of an explanation.
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Definition 6 (ABDUCTIVE EXPLANATION)
Let T = 〈P,A ,C 〉 be an abductive theory and O an observation. A pair ∆ = (E,F), where
E and F are disjoint finite sets of abducibles and F ⊆ P , is an explanation (of type A, B, C,
and D) if O is in agreement (of type A, B, C, and D, respectively) with P∆ = (P ∪E) \F and
C . We denote the sets of explanations of each type by ΨA(O,T ), ΨB(O,T ), ΨC(O,T ) and
ΨD(O,T ). 
The observations made above about each next concept of an agreement being less restrictive,
imply the following relationships between the corresponding notions of explanations.
Proposition 1
For every abductive theory T and an observation O,
ΨA(O,T )⊆ΨB(O,T )⊆ΨC(O,T )⊆ΨD(O,T ). 
In general, the four concepts of explanations do not coincide. Which of them to choose may
depend on a particular application domain. This issue is not of our concern here. Instead, we focus
on the key challenge of abductive reasoning to find general principles that can narrow down a
class of explanations and that are independent of what notion of an explanation is used. This is
indeed an important problem as even in the case of explanations of type A multiple explanations
are possible and not all of them are equally compelling.
The two most commonly used principles are subset minimality and cardinality minimality.
We say that an explanation ∆ = (E,F) is subset minimal if there is no other explanation ∆′ =
(E ′,F ′) such that E ′ ⊆ E and F ′ ⊆ F . Similarly, ∆ = (E,F) is cardinality minimal if there is no
explanation ∆′ = (E ′,F ′) such that |E ′|+ |F ′| < |E|+ |F |. We propose in the next section yet
another general principle based on the degree of arbitrariness.
3 How arbitrary is a solution?
In this section we introduce the degree of arbitrariness in an explanation of an observation as a
measure of how arbitrary the explanation is. Concepts introduced below apply to each of the four
basic models of abductive reasoning, therefore we will use the generic term explanation without
denoting its specific type. We start with examples to motivate our discussion.
Example 3
Let us consider the abduction problem presented in Example 2, and the explanations ∆u = (Su, /0)
and ∆dan = (Edan, /0). In each explanation ∆u, the constant u can be replaced with any other con-
stant u′ in the vocabulary and the result, ∆u′ , is also an explanation. That is, the occurrences of
u are not constrained by the program or, to put it differently, they are arbitrary. In contrast, re-
placing the constant dan in ∆dan with any other constant does not yield an explanation (assuming
there are no other visitors in the program but dan). Thus, there is no arbitrariness in ∆dan. In
other words, ∆dan is constrained by the available information. 
We will use the idea of “replaceability” to formalize the notions of arbitrariness and con-
strainedness, and their generalization, the degree of arbitrarines.
Definition 7 (OCCURRENCE)
Let p(x) be a ground atom, where p has arity n and k is an integer such that 1≤ k≤ n. We denote
by p(x)[k] the constant in the position k in p(x).
If E is a set of ground atoms, an occurrence of a constant c in E is an expression of the form
p(x)k, where p(x) is an atom in E , and p(x)[k] = c. 
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Definition 8 (REPLACEMENT FUNCTION)
Let T = 〈P,A ,C 〉 be an abductive theory, E a set of abducibles (that is, E ⊆ A D ), and let c
be a constant occurring in E . A replacement function for E and c determined by a non-empty set
C of some (not necessarily all) occurrences of c in E , is a function fE,C : D → 2A D such that for
each x ∈D , fE,C(x) is the set E ′ obtained by replacing with x each constant c in E referred to by
an occurrence in C. 
We observe that, given a set E and a constant c occurring in E in n places, the number of
possible replacement functions is 2n− 1.
Example 4
Let us consider the set E = {p(1,2),s(2,3)} and the constant 2. The possible replacement func-
tions are: (1) fE,C1 , where C1 = {p(1,2)2}; (2) fE,C2 , where C2 = {s(2,3)1}; and (3) fE,C3 , where
C3 = {p(1,2)2,s(2,3)1}. 
Definition 9 (INDEPENDENCE OF REPLACEMENT FUNCTIONS)
Let fE,C1 and fE,C2 be replacement functions for a set E ⊆ A D and for constants c1 and c2,
respectively. We say that fE,C1 and fE,C2 are independent if c1 6= c2 or if C1∩C2 = /0. 
Let us consider the replacement functions presented in Example 4. While the functions fE,C1
and fE,C2 are independent, the functions fE,C3 and fE,C1 (similarly, fE,C3 and fE,C2 ) are not inde-
pendent.
Definition 10 (DEGREE OF ARBITRARINESS)
Let T = 〈P,A ,C 〉 be an abductive theory, O an observation, ∆ = (E,F) an explanation for
O wrt T , and let ξ be an arbitrary constant in D not occurring in E ∪O∪P . The degree of
arbitrariness of ∆, denoted δ (∆), is the maximum number of pairwise independent replacement
functions fE,C (not necessarily all for the same constant) such that ∆′ = ( fE,C(ξ ),F) is an expla-
nation for O wrt T . 
Since the domain D is infinite, one can always find a constant ξ not occurring in E ∪O∪P .
Moreover, since E is finite, there is an upper bound on the number of pairwise independent
replacement functions one can have for E . Finally, the specific choice of the replacement constant
ξ does not affect the maximum. Thus, the degree of arbitrariness is well defined. The examples
below illustrate the concepts we have introduced above.
Example 5
Let T = 〈P,A , /0〉, where the program P consists of the facts {p(1), p(2), q(1),q(2),q(3)}
and of a single rule t ← p(X),not q(X). Let us suppose that p and q are abducible predicates and
that O = {t}. The following pairs of sets of abducibles form explanations for O wrt T :
∆1 =( /0,{q(1)}). ∆2 =( /0,{q(2)}). ∆3 =({p(3)},{q(3)}). ∆x =({p(x)}, /0), where x /∈ {1,2,3}.
It is evident that δ (∆1) = δ (∆2) = 0. Similarly, it is evident that δ (∆3) = δ (∆x) = 1 (the only
constant in the “add” part of these explanations can be replaced with a fresh constant ξ and the
result is an explanation). 
In Example 5, the explanation ∆3 is not satisfactory. Once we decide to remove q(3), there
is no reason why we have to add p(3). Adding any atom p(ξ ), with ξ /∈ {1,2} works equally
well. Thus, the choice of the constant 3 in p(3) is arbitrary and not grounded in the information
available in the theory. Similarly, ∆x, where x /∈ {1,2,3} is not satisfactory either. Here too, the
choice of x is not grounded in the abductive theory and the observation. The explanations ∆1 and
∆2 do not show this arbitrariness.
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Example 6
Let T = 〈P,A , /0〉, where A = {q,r, t} and P consists of the facts q(a,b), q(a,c), and r(a,b,c),
and two rules p(X)← q(X ,Y ),s(X ,Y,Z), and s(X ,Y,Z)← r(X ,Y,Z), t(X ,Z). Let us suppose O=
{p(a)}. One can check that each of the following pairs of sets of abducibles is an explanation:
∆x1,x2 = ({q(a,x1),r(a,x1,x2), t(a,x2)}, /0), where x1 6= c, x1 6= b and x2 6= c
∆x3 = ({r(a,b,x3), t(a,x3)}, /0), where x3 6= c
∆ = ({t(a,c)}, /0).
It is evident that if x1 6= x2, then δ (∆x1,x2) = 2. Indeed changing all occurrences of x1 or all
occurrences of x2 to a new constant ξ results in an explanation. In addition, the corresponding
replacement functions for each constant and all its occurrences are obviously independent (they
concern different constants). Finally, replacing either constant in only one position does not yield
an explanation. More interestingly, if x1 = x2 = x, δ (∆x,x) = 2, too. Here, x has four occurrences
in ∆x,x: q(a,x)2, r(a,x,x)2, r(a,x,x)3 and t(a,x)2. Let f1 and f2 be the replacement functions for
x determined by the first two and the last two positions, respectively. Then f1 and f2 are indepen-
dent, and both ( f1(ξ ), /0) and ( f2(ξ ), /0) are explanations. However, three mutually independent
functions with this property cannot be found. Similarly, one can see that δ (∆x3) = 1 (all occur-
rences of x3 are free for a simultaneous change) and δ (∆) = 0 (neither a nor c can be changed to
a fresh constant). 
In this example, all explanations are minimal and so, the subset-minimality criterion is not
discriminating enough. However, ∆ arguably is more compelling than the other ones. It uses no
extraneous constants, and all constants occurring in it are constrained by the theory and an ob-
servation. The lowest degree of arbitrariness criterion correctly identifies ∆ as the only preferred
explanation. We will refer to it as the principle of minimum arbitrariness.
The most compelling are those explanations that have no arbitrariness at all. This suggests the
notion of constrained explanations.
Definition 11 (CONSTRAINED AND ARBITRARY EXPLANATIONS)
Let T be an abductive theory 〈P,A ,C 〉, O an observation, and ∆ an explanation for O wrt T .
We say that ∆ is constrained if δ (∆) = 0. Otherwise, ∆ is arbitrary. 
In the remainder of this paper we discuss the principle of the lowest degree of arbitrariness,
focusing our study primarily on the class of constrained explanations. We start with some general
observations.
The principle of minimum arbitrariness can be used with all types of explanations we dis-
cussed in the previous sections. Moreover, it is “orthogonal” to other criteria one might consider
when selecting preferred explanations such as the subset or cardinality minimality. Therefore, it
can be combined with them. For instance, we might consider as preferred those subset-minimal
explanations that have the smallest degree of arbitrariness (if we believe, that subset minimality
is more important than minimum arbitrariness). For instance, coming back to Example 2, we see
that the explanations (Etom, /0), (Emary, /0), (Su, /0), u 6= tom, (Edan, /0), and (Vu, /0), u 6= dan, are sub-
set minimal. Selecting from among them only the constrained ones yields (Etom, /0), (Emary, /0),
and (Edan, /0). Alternatively, we could take as preferred those explanations with the minimum
degree of arbitrariness that are subset minimal (if we believe that minimum arbitrariness should
be the primary consideration). In Example 2, the explanation (Etom,dan, /0) is constrained but not
minimal. In general, the two concepts are different. Similar examples can be provided for the
minimum cardinality criterion. We do not consider these and other possible combinations of
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the principles in this paper but focus exclusively on the properties of the principle of minimum
arbitrariness.
The degree of arbitrariness of an explanation (E,F) depends only on the “add” part E; the
“delete” component, F , has no effect on arbitrariness. Intuitively, the reason is that we can delete
only those atoms that are in P . Thus, if we replace a constant in an atom p in F with a fresh
constant ξ , the effect simply is that p is no longer deleted. The same effect can be achieved by
considering F \{p} in place of F . It is natural to impose on F some requirements, such as subset
or cardinality minimality. However, as we noted above, we do not pursue this possibility here.
The next result shows that constrained explanations use only constants that are mentioned in
an abductive theory and an observation. This property is consistent with the general principle of
parsimony (Occam’s razor). It is important as it allows us to restrict the scope of searches for
constrained explanations.2
Theorem 1
Let T = 〈P,A ,C 〉 be an abductive theory and (E,F) a constrained explanation of an observa-
tion O. Then every constant symbol occurring in (E,F) occurs in T or in O.
Finally, we note that the minimum arbitrariness criterion does not impose any conditions on
abducible predicates of arity 0 and some other criteria should be considered. Therefore, we are
primarily interested in the case when every abducible predicate symbol has a positive arity.
4 Computational Complexity
Our primary technical contribution concerns reasoning about constrained explanations. We are
interested in the following two problems: deciding whether a given explanation is constrained;
and deciding whether a constrained explanation exists. We restrict attention to abductive theories
with stratified programs and assume that these programs are interpreted by the stable-model se-
mantics. This is an important class of abductive theories. First, stratified programs are regarded
as semantically “non-controversial.” Indeed, the stable-model semantics and the well-founded
semantics coincide on stratified programs and are generally accepted as providing them the cor-
rect meaning. Second, under the stable-model semantics, for abductive theories with stratified
programs, the distinctions between the four types of explanations we introduced disappear. For-
mally, we have the following result.
Theorem 2
For every abductive theory T = 〈P,A ,C 〉, where P is stratified and interpreted under the
stable-model semantics, and every observation O,
ΨA(O,T ) = ΨB(O,T ) = ΨC(O,T ) = ΨD(O,T ). 
Because of Theorem 2, below we use the generic term explanation without specifying its type.
Let 〈P,A ,C 〉 be an abductive logic theory. We represent P as the union of a set B of all
abducibles in P and the set R of the remaining facts and rules. We will consider the complexity
of the problems stated above under the assumption that R and C are fixed and input consists of
B and an observation O. We start our study of the complexity by noting the following two upper
bounds.
2 The proofs of all results we give in the paper can be found in the appendix
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Theorem 3
Let A be a set of abducible predicates, R a (fixed) stratified program with no abducible predicates
in the heads of its rules, and C a (fixed) set of integrity constraints.
1. The following problem is in coNP: given a set B of abducibles, an observation O, and
a pair ∆= (E,F) of sets of abducibles, decide whether ∆ is a constrained explanation
for O wrt 〈R∪B,A ,C 〉.
2. The following problem is in ΣP2 : given a set B of abducibles and an observation O,
decide whether a constrained explanation for O wrt 〈R∪B,A ,C 〉 exists.
There are three sources of complexity: negation in programs, recursion in programs, and the
presence of integrity constraints. The next three results show that each of these sources by itself
pushes the complexity up to match the upper bounds of Theorem 3. The first of them concerns
the case when the program in an abductive theory is non-recursive but with negation, and there
are no integrity constraints.
Theorem 4
Let A be a set of abducible predicates and R a (fixed) non-recursive program with no abducible
predicates in the heads of its rules.
1. The following problem is coNP-complete: given a set B of abducibles, an observa-
tion O, and a pair (E,F) of sets of abducibles, decide whether (E,F) is a constrained
explanation for O wrt 〈R∪B,A , /0〉.
2. The following problem is ΣP2 -complete: given a set B of abducibles and an observa-
tion O, decide whether a constrained explanation for O wrt 〈R∪B,A , /0〉 exists.
The next theorem shows that when there are no integrity constraints, disallowing negation,
that is, restricting attention to Horn programs, also leads to the same complexity results as long
as we allow recursion.
Theorem 5
Let A be a set of abducible predicates and R a (fixed) Horn program with no abducible predicates
in the heads of its rules.
1. The following problem is coNP-complete: given a set B of abducibles, an observa-
tion O, and a pair (E,F) of sets of abducibles, decide whether (E,F) is a constrained
explanation for O wrt 〈R∪B,A , /0〉.
2. The following problem is ΣP2 -complete: given a set B of abducibles and an observa-
tion O, decide whether a constrained explanation for O wrt 〈R∪B,A , /0〉 exists.
The third result addresses the case of abductive theories with particularly simple programs,
namely, non-recursive Horn, but with integrity constraints.
Theorem 6
Let A be a set of abducible predicates, R a (fixed) non-recursive Horn program with no abducible
predicates in the heads of its rules, and C a (fixed) set of integrity constraints.
1. The following problem is coNP-complete: given a set B of abducibles, an observa-
tion O, and a pair (E,F) of sets of abducibles, decide whether (E,F) is a constrained
explanation for O wrt 〈R∪B,A ,C 〉.
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2. The following problem is ΣP2 -complete: given a set B of abducibles and an observa-
tion O, decide whether a constrained explanation for O wrt 〈R∪B,A ,C 〉 exists.
On the other end of the spectrum, we have a particularly simple case when neither of the three
sources of complexity is present: the case of abductive theories with non-recursive Horn pro-
grams and without integrity constraints. For this class of theories the two problems are tractable.
Theorem 7
Let A be a set of abducible predicates and R a (fixed) non-recursive Horn program with no
abducible predicates in the heads of its rules. The following problems are in P.
1. Given a set B of abducibles, an observation O, and a pair (E,F) of sets of abducibles,
decide whether (E,F) is a constrained explanation for O wrt 〈R∪B,A , /0〉.
2. Given a set B of abducibles and an observation O, decide whether a constrained
explanation for O wrt 〈R∪B,A , /0〉 exists.
5 Related Work
Abduction was introduced to artificial intelligence in early 1970s by Harry Pople Jr. (1973),
where it is now commonly understood as the inference to the best explanation (Josephson and Josephson 1996).
Over the years several criteria have been proposed to identify the preferred (best) explanations, all
rooted in the Occam’s razor parsimony principle. The most commonly considered one is subset-
minimality (Bylander et al. 1991; Konolige 1992; Selman and Levesque 1990). A more restric-
tive condition of minimum cardinality has also been broadly studied (Peng and Reggia 1990).
The abduction reasoning formalism we study in the paper uses logic programs to represent
background knowledge in abductive theories. It is referred to as abductive logic programming
(Eshghi and Kowalski 1989; Kakas et al. 1992; Dung 1991). Abductive explanations which al-
low the removal of hypotheses are first introduced by Inoue and Sakama (1995). The impor-
tance of abductive logic programming to knowledge representation was argued by Denecker
and Schreye (1995). It was applied in diagnosis (Console et al. 1996), planning (Eshghi 1988;
do Lago Pereira and de Barros 2004), natural language understanding (Balsa et al. 1995), and case-
based reasoning (Satoh 1996). Denecker and Kakas (2002) provide a comprehensive survey of
the area.
The complexity of abductive reasoning was first studied by Bylander et al. (1991). Eiter et al.
(1997) studied the complexity of reasoning tasks in the abductive logic programming setting.
The profusion of abductive explanations was explicitly noted by Maher (2005) in his work on
constraint abduction. Maher considers a differennt setting and handles the problem by different
techniques. The key similarity is that in Maher’s setting, as in ours, symbols from the vocabulary
not present in the theory can give rise to alternative explanations.
None of the earlier works on abduction considered the concepts of constrainedness or ar-
bitrariness. These concepts were proposed by us for the setting of view updates in deductive
databases (Caroprese et al. 2012). View updating consists of modifying base relations to impose
properties on view relations, that is, relations defined on the database by queries. The subject has
received much attention in database research (cf. the survey papers by Fraternali and Paraboschi
(1993), and Mayol and Teniente (1999)). There is a natural connection between view updating
and abduction (Kakas and Mancarella 1990a; Console et al. 1995). The view plays the role of the
background theory, all base relation symbols are abducible predicates, and requests for a view
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update are observations. The role of integrity constraints is the same in both areas. However,
there is an important distinction here. In view updating, integrity constraints concern only base
relation, a restriction not present in abductive settings. Our present work adapts the notions of
constrainedness and arbitrariness to the more general setting of abduction. Importantly, we in-
troduce the new concept of the degree of arbitrariness, which allows us to compare explanations
even when no constrained explanations exist.
6 Concluding Remarks
We proposed a new approach to limiting the space of explanations in abductive logic program-
ming extended by integrity constraints. Specifically, we introduced the degree of arbitrariness as
a measure of the quality of an explanation. It imposes a hierarchy on the space of explanations
(possibly already narrowed down by means of other principles): the lower the degree of arbitrari-
ness, the more compelling an explanation. Explanations with the degree of arbitrariness equal to
0 are particularly important. We presented a detailed account of the complexity of reasoning with
constrained explanations when programs in abductive theories are stratified. In our discussion in
Sections 2 and 3 we were implicitly assuming that the set semS(P) consisted of two-valued in-
terpretations. However, our definitions can also be extended to the three-valued well-founded
semantics. Moreover, since for stratified programs the well-founded and the stable-model se-
mantics coincide, all complexity results we obtained hold for that case, too. Finally, our approach
applies to each of the four basic models of abductive reasoning, three of which have been studied
before, with the remaining one (Definition 4) to the best of our knowledge being new. Our dis-
cussion and the results suggest that the notions of the degree of arbitrariness and constrainedness
are important additions to the space of fundamental principles of abductive reasoning. We note,
however, that as with other principles there are situations where the minimum degree of arbitrari-
ness may not be the appropriate principle to use for abduction. For example, let us consider the
transitive closure program containing two rules: tc(x,y)← r(x,y) and tc(x,y)← r(x,z), tc(z,y)
with an abducible predicate r. If we observe tc(a,b), the explanation E1 = ({r(a,b)}, /0) is con-
strained while E2 = ({r(a,z),r(z,b)}, /0)} is arbitrary (z can be replaced by any constant in the
vocabulary of the language). Thus, according to the minimum degree of arbitrariness criterion,
E1 is preferred to E2. However, if the relation tc is the ancestor relation, r is the parent re-
lation and ancestor(a,b) is observed, preferring the constrained explanation {parent(a,b)} to
{parent(a,c), parent(c,b)}, which is arbitrary, may be a point of dispute. Establishing condi-
tions to help decide which criteria to use when is a grand challenge of the area of abduction. For
the example we just gave, we note that the minimum cardinality principle would give the same
result as the minimum arbitrariness one and would be open to the same question. Our work opens
several avenues for future research. First, we do not have a clear picture of the complexity of the
case of abductive theories with non-recursive Horn programs and with integrity constraints re-
stricted only to abducible predicates. This case is of interest due to its view updating applications.
Next, there is a challenging problem of resolving the complexity of reasoning with constrained
explanations in the case of abductive theories with arbitrary programs.
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Appendix – Proofs
Theorem 1
Let T = 〈P,A ,C 〉 be an abductive theory and (E,F) a constrained explanation of an observa-
tion O. Then every constant symbol occurring in (E,F) occurs in T or in O.
Proof
Since F ⊆ P (as required by the definition of an explanation), every constant occurring in F
occurs in P . If α is a constant appearing in E but not in T nor in O, then changing α to a fresh
constant ξ results in an explanation3 and so, contradicts the constrainedness of (E,F).
Theorem 2
For every abductive theory T = 〈P,A ,C 〉, where P is stratified and interpreted under the
stable-model semantics, and for every observation O,
ΨA(O,T ) = ΨB(O,T ) = ΨC(O,T ) = ΨD(O,T ).
Proof
The assertion follows by the fact that a stratified program admits exactly one stable model.
Theorem 3
Let A be a set of abducible predicates, R a (fixed) stratified program with no abducible predicates
in the heads of its rules, and C a (fixed) set of integrity constraints.
1. The following problem is in coNP: given a set B of abducibles, an observation O, and a
pair ∆ = (E,F) of sets of abducibles, decide whether ∆ is a constrained explanation for O
wrt 〈R∪B,A ,C 〉.
2. The following problem is in ΣP2 : given a set B of abducibles and an observation O, decide
whether a constrained explanation for O wrt 〈R∪B,A ,C 〉 exists.
Proof
(1) The complementary problem consists of deciding that (E,F) is not an explanation or that is an
arbitrary explanation. The following non-deterministic polynomial-time algorithm decides this
problem. Since R is stratified, one can compute the only stable model, say M, of R∪((B∪E)\F)
in time linear in the size of B and (E,F). If E and F are not disjoint (which can be checked
efficiently), or if M 6|= O, or if M 6|= C , the (E,F) is not an explanation. Otherwise, (E,F) is an
explanation and we proceed as follows. We non-deterministically guess the set C of occurrences
of some constant c occurring in E . We then compute (E ′,F) by replacing all occurrences of c
mentioned in C with a fresh constant ξ and, in the same way as before, determine whether (E ′,F)
is an explanation of O.
(2) If (E,F) is a constrained explanation, then E and F consist of abducibles involving only
constants appearing in T and O (cf. Theorem 1). It follows, that if (E,F) is a constrained expla-
nation, the size of E∪F is polynomial in the size of the input. Thus, the problem can be decided
by the following non-deterministic polynomial time algorithm with an oracle: guess sets E and F
of abducibles and check that (E,F) is a constrained explanation. By (1), that task can be decided
by a call to a coNP oracle.
3 We tacitly assume here that the semantics of logic programs we consider here are insensitive to the renaming of
constants. All standard semantics of programs have this property.
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Theorem 4
Let A be a set of abducible predicates and R a (fixed) non-recursive program with no abducible
predicates in the heads of its rules.
1. The following problem is coNP-complete: given a set B of abducibles, an observation O,
and a pair (E,F) of sets of abducibles, decide whether (E,F) is a constrained explanation
for O wrt 〈R∪B,A , /0〉.
2. The following problem is ΣP2 -complete: given a set B of abducibles and an observation O,
decide whether a constrained explanation for O wrt 〈R∪B,A , /0〉 exists.
Proof
(1) The membership part was established in Theorem 3. Thus, it suffices to show the hardness
part.
We note that the following version of the SAT problem is NP-complete (membership is evi-
dent, hardness follows by a straightforward reduction from SAT):
Input: A set of atoms Y and a CNF formula F over Y that is not satisfied by the all-false assign-
ment
Question: Is F satisfiable (is the QBF formula ∃Y F true)?
We will reduce that problem to the problem whether (under the notation in the statement of the
theorem) an explanation (E,F) is arbitrary.
Let then Y be a set of atoms and F a CNF theory that is not satisfied by the all-false assignment
on Y . We denote by Cl(F) the set of clauses in F . Let us consider the vocabulary σ consisting
of predicate symbols bad/0, inY/1, clause/1, pos/2, ngtd/2, choose/2, gate/1, true/1, holds/1,
sometrue/0, allfalse/0, sat/0, clfalse/0 and goal/0, and an abductive theory
T (F) = 〈T (F),{choose}, /0〉,
where T (F) = R∪B, B consists of the atoms
1. inY (a), for every a ∈Y
2. gate(0), where 0 /∈ Y
3. pos(a,c), for every atom a ∈ Y and clause c ∈ Cl(F) such that a occurs non-negated in c
4. ngtd(a,c), for every atom a ∈ At(F) and clause c ∈ Cl(F) such that a occurs negated in c
and R consists of the rules
1. clause(C)← pos(A,C)
2. clause(C)← ngtd(A,C)
3. true(A)← inY (A),gate(W ), not choose(A,W )
4. holds(C)← pos(A,C), true(A)
5. holds(C)← ngtd(A,C), not true(A)
6. clfalse← clause(C), not holds(C)
7. sat ← not clfalse
8. sometrue← inY (A), true(A)
9. allfalse← not sometrue
10. bad ← choose(A,W ), not inY (A)
11. goal← allfalse, not bad
12. goal← sat, not bad.
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Let {goal} be the set of observed atoms. It is clear that U = ({choose(a,0) : a ∈ Y}, /0) is an
explanation (goal is derived through the first of its two rules). If F is satisfiable, then let Y ′ ⊆ Y
be (the representation of) an assignment that satisfies F . One can check that ({choose(a,0) : a ∈
(Y \Y ′)}∪{choose(a,ξ ) : a ∈ Y ′}, /0) is an explanation (now, goal can be derived via its second
rule). Moreover, Y ′ 6= /0 (by our restriction on the class of formulas). Thus, ({choose(a,0) : a ∈
Y}, /0) is arbitrary.
Conversely, let us assume that U = ({choose(a,0) : a ∈ Y}, /0) is arbitrary. Then replacing
some occurrences of one of the constants must yield an explanation. Replacing a constant a ∈ Y
with fresh constant symbol ξ does not yield an explanation. Indeed, we would have choose(ξ ,0)
and no inY (ξ ) in the “add” part of the explanation. Thus, bad would hold and would block any
possibility of deriving goal. It follows that one or more occurrences of 0 can be replaced by ξ
so that the result, ({choose(a,0) : a ∈ (Y \Y ′)}∪{choose(a,ξ ) : a ∈Y ′}, /0), is an explanation of
goal. Here Y ′ ⊆Y is the non-empty set of elements in Y identifying the occurrences of 0 replaced
by ξ . Since Y ′ 6= /0, goal is derived via the second rule. It follows that sat is derivable and so,
every clause in F holds in the interpretation that assigns true to all elements of Y ′ and false to all
other elements of Y . Thus, F is satisfiable.
It follows that deciding whether an explanation (E,F) is arbitrary is NP-hard. Since every
explanation is either arbitrary or constrained, the problem to decide whether (E,F) is constrained
is coNP-hard.
(2) As before, the membership part of the assertion follows from Theorem 3. To prove the hard-
ness part, we note that the following problem is ΣP2 -complete:
Input: Two disjoint sets X and Y of atoms, and a DNF formula G over X ∪Y such that for every
truth assignment vX to atoms in X , the all-false assignment to atoms in Y is a model of formula
G|vX
Question: Is the quantified boolean formula Φ = ∃X∀Y G true.
We will reduce it to our problem.
Let F be the CNF obtained from ¬G by applying the De Morgan’s and the double negation
laws. Clearly, F ≡ ¬G. Let Cl(F) be the set of clauses of F . Let us consider the vocabulary σ
consisting of predicate symbols inX , inY , clause/1, pos/2, ngtd/2, choose/2, gate/1, trueX/1,
trueY/1, true/1, holds/1, sometrue/0, allfalse/0, sat/0, clfalse/0, bad/0, good/1, and goal/0,
and an abductive theory
T (F) = 〈T (F),{trueX ,choose}, /0〉,
where T (F) = R∪B, B consists of the atoms:
1. inX(a), for every a ∈ X
2. inY (a), for every a ∈Y
3. gate(0), where 0 /∈ Y
4. pos(a,c), for every atom a ∈ X ∪Y and clause c ∈ Cl(F) such that a occurs non-negated
in c
5. ngtd(a,c), for every atom a ∈ X ∪Y and clause c ∈ Cl(F) such that a occurs negated in c
and R consists of the rules
1. clause(C)← pos(A,C)
2. clause(C)← ngtd(A,C)
3. trueY (A)← inY (A),gate(W ), not choose(A,W )
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4. true(A)← trueX(A)
5. true(A)← trueY (A)
6. holds(C)← pos(A,C), true(A)
7. holds(C)← ngtd(A,C), not true(A)
8. clfalse← clause(C), not holds(C)
9. sat ← not clfalse
10. sometrue← inY (A), trueY (A)
11. allfalse← not sometrue
12. bad ← choose(A,W ), not inY (A)
13. bad ← trueX(A), not inX (A)
14. good(A)← inY (A),choose(A,W )
15. bad ← inY (A), not good(A)
16. goal← allfalse, not bad
17. goal← sat, not bad.
Let O = {goal} be an observation. We will prove that Φ is true if and only if goal has a con-
strained explanation from T (F).
(⇒) Let vX be an assignment of truth values to variables in X such that the formula ∀Y G|vX is
true. Here by G|vX we denote the formula obtained from G by substituting the truth values given
by vX for the corresponding variables from X , and then by simplifying these values away. We
understand the formula F |vX in the same way. Clearly, F|vX ≡ ¬G|vX . Thus, ∃Y F |vX is false.
Let us define
E = {trueX(a) : a ∈ X and vX(a) = true}∪
{choose(a,0) : a ∈ Y}.
We will show that (E, /0) is a constrained explanation of goal. First, it is evident that (E, /0) is an
explanation as goal can be derived through the first of its two rules. Next, we note that we cannot
replace any constant a appearing in atoms trueX(a) with a new constant ξ . Indeed, if trueX (ξ )
were to be a part of a the “add” part of an explanation, bad would hold (via the rule (13)) and
goal would not! Similarly, we cannot replace a ∈ Y in any atom choose(a,0), as only elements
of Y must show on these positions, the property forced by rule (12). Finally, we cannot replace
any non-empty set of 0’s with ξ . If any such replacement resulted in an explanation, goal could
only be derived through its second clause (allfalse cannot be derived now). However, that would
imply that ∃Y F |vX is true, with the “witness” assignment assigning true to every y ∈ Y such that
choose(y,ξ ) is a part of the modified explanation, and false to all other elements of Y .
(⇐) Let us assume that goal has a constrained explanation. It must have a form (E, /0), where
E = {trueX (a) : a ∈U}∪{choose(a,b) : a ∈ Y,b ∈Ua},
where U is some subset of X and where for every a ∈ Y , Ua, is some nonempty set. Indeed, if for
some a ∈Y , there is no b such that choose(a,b) ∈ E , good(a) cannot be derived from the revised
program and, consequently, bad would follow (by the rule (15)). That would make it impossible
to derive goal.
Now, if for some a ∈ Y there is b ∈Ua such that b 6= 0, then (E, /0) is not constrained (indeed,
that constant b could be replaced by a new constant ξ without any effect on the derivability of
goal). Thus, for every a ∈ Y , Ua = {0} and so,
E = {trueX(a) : a ∈U}∪{choose(a,0) : a ∈ Y}.
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Since this explanation is constrained, there is no subset of positions where 0 occurs that can
be substituted with ξ . Therefore, ∃Y F|vX , where vX is the truth assignment determined by U ,
is false. One can show that by following the argument used in part (1) of the theorem (due to
our assumption on G, the all-false assignment to atoms in Y is not a model of F |vX ). Thus, Φ is
true.
Theorem 5
Let A be a set of abducible predicates and R a (fixed) Horn program with no abducible predicates
in the heads of its rules.
1. The following problem is coNP-complete: given a set B of abducibles, an observation O,
and a pair (E,F) of sets of abducibles, decide whether (E,F) is a constrained explanation
for O wrt 〈R∪B,A , /0〉.
2. The following problem is ΣP2 -complete: given a set B of abducibles and an observation O,
decide whether a constrained explanation for O wrt 〈R∪B,A , /0〉 exists.
Proof
(1) The membership part follows by Theorem 3. To prove hardness, we show that the problem
to decide whether (E,F) is arbitrary is NP-hard. That is sufficient, as every explanation is either
arbitrary or constrained. To show NP-hardness of the problem to decide whether an explanation
is arbitrary, we reduce the SAT problem to it.
Thus, let Y be a (finite) set of atoms, say Y = {y1, . . . ,yn}, and F a CNF consisting of clauses
c1, . . . ,cm. We denote by Cl(F) the set of clauses in F , that is, Cl(F) = {c1, . . . ,cm}. Let us also
consider three additional distinct symbols t, f and 0. We define the vocabulary σ to consist of
predicate symbols inY/1, clause/1, pos/2, ngtd/2, p/2 true/1, false/0, ok/1, next/2, nextC/2,
clsat/0, sat/1, and goal/0, and an abductive theory
T (F) = 〈T (F),{p}, /0〉,
where T (F) consists of the following atoms:
1. inY (a), for every a ∈Y ∪{t, f}
2. pos(a,c), for every atom a ∈ Y and clause c ∈ Cl(F) such that a occurs non-negated in c
3. ngtd(a,c), for every atom a ∈Y and clause c ∈ Cl(F) such that a occurs negated in c
4. next(yi,yi+1), for i = 1, . . . ,n− 1, next(t,y1), and next(yn, f )
5. nextC(ci,ci+1), for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1
6. p(t,0)
and of the following rules
1. clause(C)← pos(A,C)
2. clause(C)← ngtd(A,C)
3. true(A)← inY (A), p(A,Z), p(t,Z)
4. false(A)← inY (A), p(A,Z), p( f ,Z)
5. clsat(C)← pos(A,C), true(A)
6. clsat(C)← ngtd(A,C), false(A)
7. ok(t)
8. ok(A)← ok(A′),next(A′,A), true(A)
9. ok(A)← ok(A′),next(A′,A), false(A)
10. ok( f )← ok(A′),next(A′, f )
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11. sat(c1)← clsat(c1)
12. sat(C)← sat(C′),nextC(C′,C),clsat(C)
13. goal ← ok( f ),sat(cm), p( f ,Z).
Clearly, the pair (E, /0), where E = {p(x,0) : x ∈ Y ∪{ f}}, is an explanation of goal. Indeed,
for every x ∈ Y , both true(x) and false(x) can be derived from T (F)∪E (because p(t,0) and
p( f ,0) both hold in T (F)∪E). Thus, for every clause c, clsat(C) can be derived, too. These two
observations imply that ok( f ) and sat(cm) can both be derived from T (F)∪E . Consequently,
goal is explained by (E, /0).
Let us assume that E is arbitrary. We will prove that F is satisfiable. By the definition, one
of the constants appearing in E can be replaced by a fresh constant ξ so that the resulting pair
(E ′, /0) is an explanation of goal wrt T (F). It follows that ok( f ) can be derived from T (F)∪E ′,
that is, that for every x ∈ Y , at least one of true(x) and false(x) can be derived. This, implies that
for every x ∈Y , p(x,0) ∈ T (F)∪E ′, that is, ξ is substituted for f or 0 in E .
Since, by (13), every explanation of goal contains at least one atom of the form p( f ,z), ξ is
not substituted for f in E to produce E ′. Thus, E ′ is obtained from E by substituting ξ for some
occurrences of 0. Let U = {u∈Y ∪{ f} : p(u,ξ )∈ E ′}. If f /∈U , then let y denote any element in
U ∩Y (such an element exists as U 6= /0). Since p(t,ξ ) and p( f ,ξ ) are not in T (F)∪E ′, neither
true(y) nor false(y) can be derived from T (F)∪E ′. Thus, neither ok( f ) nor goal can be derived
from T (F)∪E ′. It follows that f ∈U . Consequently, for every x ∈U , false(x) can be derived
from T (F)∪E ′, and true(x) cannot be. Similarly, for every x∈Y \U , true(x) can be derived from
T (F)∪E ′, and false(x) cannot be. Thus, the atoms true(x) and false(x) in T (F)∪E ′ determine
a truth assignment on atoms of Y . Since sat(cm) can be derived from T (F)∪E ′, clsat(c) can be
derived form T (F)∪E ′, for every clause c in F . It follows that the truth assignment determined
by the atoms true(x) and false(x) in T (F)∪E ′ satisfies F .
Conversely, let us assume that F is satisfiable. Let us consider any satisfying assignment for
F and let U comprises f and those atoms in Y that are false under this assignment. Let E ′
be obtained from E by substituting ξ for the occurrences of 0 in atoms p(y,0), y ∈ U . It is
easy to verify that for every y ∈U , false(y) can be derived from T (F)∪E ′, and true(y) cannot
be. Similarly, for every y ∈ Y \U , true(y) can be derived from T (F)∪E ′, and false(y) cannot
be. Moreover, clsat(c) can be derived from T (F)∪E ′, for every clause c of F . Consequently,
ok( f ) and sat(cm) can be derived from T (F)∪E ′. Since p( f ,ξ ) ∈ E ′, goal can be derived from
T (F)∪E ′, that is, (E ′, /0) is an explanation of goal wrt T . Thus, (E, /0) is arbitrary.
(2) The argument for the membership part follows by Theorem 3.
We prove hardness. The problem to decide whether a QBF Φ = ∃X∀YG, where G is a DNF
formula over variables in X ∪Y , is true, is ΣP2 -complete. We will reduce it to the problem in
question.
Below, we understand vX , F , Cl(F) and G|vX as in the proof of Theorem 4. We assume that
X = {x1, . . . ,xk}, Y = {y1, . . . ,yn} and C = {c1, . . . ,cm}.
We define σ to consist of predicate symbols inX/1, inY /1, clause/1, pos/2, ngtd/2, nextX/2,
nextY/2, nextC/2, trueX/1, falseX/1, true/1, false/1, okX/1, okY/1, sat/1, fX/1, lX/1, fY /1,
lY/1, fC/1, lC/1, tr/1, fa/1, assign/2, goodX/0, goodY/0, goodC/0, good f /0, goal/0. We as-
sume three new distinct constants 0, t and f and consider an abductive theory
T (F) = 〈T (F),{trueX , falseX , assign, fa}, /0〉,
where T (F) consists of the following atoms (part B):
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1. inX(a), for every a ∈ X
2. inY (a), for every a ∈Y ∪{t, f}
3. pos(a,c), for every atom a ∈ X ∪Y and clause c ∈ Cl(F) such that a occurs non-negated
in c
4. ngtd(a,c), for every atom a ∈ X ∪Y and clause c ∈ Cl(F) such that a occurs negated in c
5. fX (x1), lX(xk)
6. fY (y1), lY (yn)
7. fC(c1), lC(cm)
8. nextX (xi,xi+1), for i = 1, . . . ,k− 1
9. nextY (yi,yi+1), for i = 1, . . . ,n− 1
10. nextC(ci,ci+1), for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1
11. tr(0)
and of the following rules (part R)
1. clause(C)← pos(A,C)
2. clause(C)← ngtd(A,C)
3. true(A)← trueX(A)
4. false(A)← falseX(A)
5. true(B)← inX(B), trueX (A), falseX(A)
6. false(B)← inX(B), trueX (A), falseX(A)
7. true(B)← inY (B), trueX(A), falseX (A)
8. false(B)← inY (B), trueX(A), falseX (A)
9. true(A)← inY (A),assign(A,Z), tr(Z)
10. false(A)← inY (A),assign(A,Z), fa(Z)
11. clsat(C)← pos(A,C), true(A)
12. clsat(C)← ngtd(A,C), false(A)
13. okX(A)← fX (A), true(A)
14. okX(A)← fX (A), false(A)
15. okX(A)← okX (A′),nextX (A′,A), true(A)
16. okX(A)← okX (A′),nextX (A′,A), false(A)
17. goodX ← okX(A), lX (A)
18. okY (A)← fY (A), true(A)
19. okY (A)← fY (A), false(A)
20. okY (A)← okY (A′),nextY (A′,A), true(A)
21. okY (A)← okY (A′),nextY (A′,A), false(A)
22. goodY ← okY (A), lY (A)
23. sat(C)← clsat(C), fC(C)
24. sat(C)← sat(C′),nextC(C′,C),clsat(C)
25. goodC ← sat(C), lC(C)
26. goal ← goodX ,goodY ,goodC, fa(Z)
27. goal ← goodX ,goodY , inY (A), false(A), true(A), fa(Z).
Let vX be an assignment of truth values to variables in X such that the formula ∀Y G|vX is true,
and let
E ={trueX (a) : a ∈ X and vX (a) = true}∪
{falseX(a) : a ∈ X and vX(a) = false}∪
{assign(y,0) : y ∈Y}∪{fa(0)}.
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It is clear that (E, /0) is an explanation for goal wrt T (F). Indeed, since for every y ∈ Y we
have true(y) and false(y), goal can be derived by means of the rule (27). Let us assume that E is
arbitrary. Then, there is a constant, say a, appearing in E such that replacing some occurrences of
a with a fresh constant ξ results in another explanation of goal. However, if a ∈ X , then neither
true(a) nor false(a) can be derived after the replacement. Consequently, we cannot derive goodX
and so, we cannot derive goal either. If a ∈ Y , then again neither true(a) nor false(a) can be
derived. Now, goodY cannot be derived and so, neither can goal. Thus, a= 0. If we do not replace
the occurrence of 0 in fa(0) with ξ , then there is y ∈ Y such that we replace the occurrence of 0
in assign(y,0) with ξ . For that y, after the replacement we cannot derive true(y) nor false(y) and
so, goodY and goal cannot be derived. It follows that there is a set Y ′ ⊆ Y such that
E ′ ={trueX (a) : a ∈ X and vX (a) = true}∪
{falseX (a) : a ∈ X and vX (a) = false}∪
{assign(y,0) : y ∈Y \Y ′}∪{assign(y,ξ ) : y ∈ Y ′}∪{fa(ξ )}
gives rise to an explanation (E ′, /0) of goal. Clearly, after applying (E ′, /0), for no y ∈ Y , both
true(y) and false(y) can be derived. Thus, goal must be derivable by means of the rule (26).
Moreover, for every y ∈ Y , we have exactly one of true(y) and false(y) hold: true(y) holds in
y ∈ Y \Y ′, and false(y) holds if y ∈ Y ′. Since goal can be derived, it follows that goodC can
be derived. Consequently, the truth assignment on Y defined by the atoms true(y) and false(y),
where y ∈ Y , satisfies the set of clauses of F |vX , that is ∃Y F |vX is true. This is a contradiction
since ∃Y F|vX ≡ ¬∀Y G|vX . Hence, (E, /0) is constrained.
Conversely, let (E, /0) be a constrained explanation of the goal. Clearly, E consists of facts of
the form trueX(a), falseX (b), assign(y,z) and fa(w). For every element x ∈ X , at least one of
trueX (x) and falseX(x) must be present in E (otherwise, we cannot derive goodX ). Moreover, if
for at least one element a ∈ X we have trueX(a) and falseX(a) in E , then changing these two
occurrences of a to ξ does not affect derivability of goal (indeed, by the rules (5)-(8) both before
and after the change we have true(x) and false(x) hold for all x ∈ X ∪Y ). Thus, (E, /0) would not
be constrained. Finally if trueX(a) or falseX(a) is in E , a∈X . Otherwise, that a could be replaced
by ξ without affecting the derivability of goal, contradicting again the assumption that (E, /0) is
constraied. It follows that if trueX(x) or falseX(x) is in E , x ∈ X and that the atoms trueX (x) and
falseX (x) that belong to E determine a truth assignment on X , say vX .
Next, let us assume that for some α 6= 0 we have assign(y,α) ∈ E . Then replacing all occur-
rences of α by ξ (including possibly an occurrence if α in fa(α)) has no effect on the derivability
of goal. As before, we get a contradiction. Thus, if E contains facts assign(y,z), they are of the
form assign(y,0). If any of these y’s is not in Y , it can be changed to ξ without affecting the
derivability of goal.
Next, we note that if E contains fa(α), where α 6= 0, that α can be changed to ξ without
affecting the derivability of goal.
If for some y ∈ Y , assign(y,0) is not in E , then for that y we can derive neither true(y) nor
false(y). Thus, we cannot derive goodY and, consequently, we cannot derive goal either. It follows
that E contains all facts assign(y,0), y∈Y , and no other facts based on the relation symbol assign.
If fa(0) is not in E , goal cannot be derived. Thus, E is of the form we considered above. Let
Y ′ ⊆ Y and let E ′ be as above. Since (E, /0) is constrained, (E ′, /0) is not an explanation of goal.
That is a truth assignment on Y such that elements in Y \Y ′ are assigned true and those in Y ′
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are assigned false is not a satisfying assingment for F |vX . Consequently, it follows that ∃YF |vX
is false and so, ∀Y G|vX is true. This last property implies that ∃X∀YG is true.
Theorem 6
Let A be a set of abducible predicates, R a (fixed) non-recursive Horn program with no abducible
predicates in the heads of its rules, and C a (fixed) set of integrity constraints.
1. The following problem is coNP-complete: given a set B of abducibles, an observation O,
and a pair (E,F) of sets of abducibles, decide whether (E,F) is a constrained explanation
for O wrt 〈R∪B,A ,C 〉.
2. The following problem is ΣP2 -complete: given a set B of abducibles and an observation O,
decide whether a constrained explanation for O wrt 〈R∪B,A ,C 〉 exists.
Proof
(1) The membership part follows by Theorem 3. To prove hardness, we show that the problem
to decide whether (E,F) is arbitrary is NP-hard. That is sufficient, as every explanation is either
arbitrary or constrained. To show NP-hardness of the problem to decide whether an explanation
is arbitrary, we reduce the SAT problem to it. Thus, let Y be a (finite) set of atoms and F a CNF
theory over Y . As before, we denote by Cl(F) the set of clauses in F . Let us also consider three
additional distinct symbols t, f and 0. We define the vocabulary σ to consist of predicate symbols
inY/1, clause/1, pos/2, ngtd/2, p/2 true/1, false/0, ok/1, next/2, nextC/2, clsat/0, sat/1, and
goal/0, and an abductive theory
T (F) = 〈T (F),{p},C 〉,
where T (F) consists of the following atoms:
1. inY (a), for every a ∈Y ∪{t, f}
2. pos(a,c), for every atom a ∈ Y and clause c ∈ Cl(F) such that a occurs non-negated in c
3. ngtd(a,c), for every atom a ∈Y and clause c ∈ Cl(F) such that a occurs negated in c
4. p(t,0)
and of the rules
1. clause(C)← pos(A,C)
2. clause(C)← ngtd(A,C)
3. true(A)← inY (A), p(A,Z), p(t,Z)
4. false(A)← inY (A), p(A,Z), p( f ,Z)
5. clsat(C)← pos(A,C), true(A)
6. clsat(C)← ngtd(A,C), false(A)
7. goal← p( f ,X)
and where C consists of
1. ∀C clause(C)⊃ clsat(C)
2. ∀A inY (A)⊃ false(A)∨ true(A).
Clearly, the pair (E, /0), where E = {p(x,0) : x ∈ Y ∪{ f}}, is an explanation of goal. Indeed,
for every x ∈ Y , both true(x) and false(x) can be derived from T (F)∪E (because p(t,0) and
p( f ,0) both hold in T (F)∪ E). Thus, for every clause c, clsat(C) can be derived, too. Con-
sequently, the two integrity constraints in the theory hold for the least model of the program
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T (F)∪ E . Moreover, goal belongs to this unique model and so, it is entailed by the revised
theory.
Let us assume that E is arbitrary. We will prove that F is satisfiable. By the definition of
arbitrariness, one of the constants appearing in E can be replaced by a fresh constant ξ so that
the resulting pair (E ′, /0) is an explanation of goal wrt T (F), that is, the least model of T (F)∪E ′
satisfies both integrity constraints of the abductive theory and contains an atom of the form p( f ,z)
(in order for goal to hold.
If f is replaced with ξ in E , then the least model of T (F)∪E ′ does not contain any fact of the
form p( f ,X), and (E ′, /0) is not an explanation. If some atom x ∈Y is replaced by ξ , then for that
atom neither true(x) nor false(x) belongs to the least model of T (F)∪E ′, which means that this
model violates the second integrity constraint, contrary to the fact that (E ′, /0) is an explanation.
Thus, there is a non-empty set U ⊆ Y ∪{ f}, such that when each occurrence of 0 in p(x,0),
where u ∈U , is replaced by ξ , the resulting set E ′ = {p(x,ξ ) : x ∈U}∪{p(x,0) : x ∈ (Y \U)}
gives rise to an explanation (E ′, /0). Let us assume that f /∈ U . Since U 6= /0, U ∩Y 6= /0. Let
x ∈U ∩Y . For this x, the least model of T (F)∪E ′ contains neither false(x) nor true(x), violating
the second integrity constraint. Thus, f ∈ U and, consequently, the least model of T (F)∪E ′,
contains atoms false(x), where x ∈ U \ { f}, and true(x), where x ∈ Y \U . It follows that this
set of atoms defines a valuation on Y . Moreover, since the first integrity constraint holds, this
valuation satisfies all clauses of F .
Conversely, let us assume that F is satisfiable. Let us consider any satisfying assignment for
F and let U comprises f and those atoms in Y that are false under this assignment. Let E ′ be
obtained from E by substituting ξ for the occurrences of 0 in atoms p(y,0), y ∈ U . It is easy
to verify that for every y ∈U , false(y) can be derived from T (F)∪E ′, and true(y) cannot be.
Similarly, for every y ∈ Y \U , true(y) can be derived from T (F)∪E ′, and false(y) cannot be.
Moreover, clsat(c) can be derived from T (F)∪E ′, for every clause c of F . Thus, both integrity
constraints are satisfied by the least model of T (F)∪E ′, and that model also contains p( f ,ξ )
and so, also goal. Thus, (E, /0) is an arbitrary explanation of goal.
(2) The membership part follows by Theorem 3. To prove hardness we proceed similarly as in
the proofs of Theorems 4 and 5.
Theorem 7
Let A be a set of abducible predicates and R a (fixed) non-recursive Horn program with no
abducible predicates in the heads of its rules. The following problems are in P.
1. Given a set B of abducibles, an observation O, and a pair (E,F) of sets of abducibles,
decide whether (E,F) is a constrained explanation for O wrt 〈R∪B,A , /0〉.
2. Given a set B of abducibles and an observation O, decide whether a constrained explanation
for O wrt 〈R∪B,A , /0〉 exists.
Proof
(1) Let us consider an explanation (E,F). Since R is non-recursive, there is a constant, say k, such
that any proof of o based on the rules in R and facts in B revised by (E,F) has length bounded
from above by k. Thus, the total number of facts used in any such proof is bounded by k, too.
Since at most k atoms in E are relevant to any proof, if E contains more than k abducibles with
predicate symbols of positive arity, it is not constrained. Indeed, at least one of these abducibles
does not play any role in the proof. For for this abducible, say a = p(c1, . . . ,cm), we have that
replacing c1 with ξ in a results in an explanation.
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If on the other hand, the number of abducibles with predicate symbols of positive arity in E
is less than or equal to k, then the total number of constants occurring in all abducibles in E is
bounded by a constant k′ dependent on R only (independent of the size of input, that is, of the
size of B). Thus, there is only a fixed number of possible selections of occurrences of a constant
for replacement by a new symbol ξ . For each of them, we can test in polynomial time whether it
leads to an explanation. Thus, we can decide whether (E,F) is constrained in polynomial time.
(2) If (E,F) is a constrained explanation, then (E, /0) is a constrained explanation. Moreover, we
can assume that E contains all zero arity abducibles in B. Thus, each such constrained explana-
tion is determined by its non-zero arity abducibles. Non-zero arity abducibles in a constrained
explanation use only constants appearing in O and P (Theorem 1). It follows, the set of all pos-
sible non-zero arity abducibles that might be chosen to form E has size that is polynomial in the
size of B (the input size). Since by an argument from the previous proof, we can assume that E
contains no more than k non-zero arity abducibles (where k is a constant depending only on R),
the set of all candidate explanations that need to be tested to decide the problem is polynomial
in the size of input. Since each such candidate explanation can be tested for constrainedness in
polynomial time (by the previous result), the assertion follows.
